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Abstract.
It is without doubt the case that memory of the past has been and is being used in certain places to
justify radical intolerance and unspeakable violence. But for every instance where that is the case, a
dozen alternative cases exist where memory creates cohesion, positive change, and a less violent
society. This article focuses on the instances where memory does the latter. It first discusses why and
how the formation of a public memory culture can be preventive of future violence. Next, it
introduces several categories of memory practices, each of which exemplifies the embodied nature of
public memory, and each of which demonstrates the capacity for memory to bring people together,
rather than tear them apart. This survey of memory practices illustrates an array of successful means
for both remembering the past and preventing violence in the future.
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Introduction
In his book In Praise of Forgetting, journalist and social critic David Rieff disputes what he sees 
as a normative understanding that, in order to prevent future atrocities, we must remember the 
atrocities of the past. He critiques George Santayana’s precept that “he who does not remember 
the past is condemned to repeat it,” arguing that, in some cases, memory of past hatreds does not 
prevent the recurrence of violence, but encourages it. By highlighting several intractable conflicts 
that exemplify a contentious relationship with past violence, including Israel-Palestine and the 
Balkans, Rieff advocates for “forgetting” the past—a strategy that he sees in some cases as the only 
means of moving forward without the risk of returning to violence. Rieff writes:
[F]ar too often collective historical memory as understood and deployed by communities, 
peoples, and nations…has led to war rather than peace, to rancor and ressentiment [sic]…
rather than reconciliation, and to the determination to exact revenge rather than commit to 
the hard work of forgiveness.1
Rieff’s text has garnered significant attention in various news media and among people working 
in the fields of memory studies and transitional justice. The International Center for Transitional 
Justice (ICTJ) even hosted an online debate between Rieff and transitional justice advocate Pablo 
de Greiff on the question “Does collective memory impede reconciliation?” Interestingly, Rieff’s 
theory has received this attention despite the fact that he offers scant evidence for his arguments 
beyond his own presumptions. He engages with little of the vast literature on memory (the book, 
in fact, includes no bibliography or citations), especially the plethora of recent work on the subject.2 
Instead, he opts to quote poetry and literature alongside only a few major theorists of memory, like 
Pierre Nora.3 
Rieff claims that the notion that memory of past atrocities like the Holocaust can serve as a 
deterrent of future violence is “magical thinking, and of a fairly extreme kind.”4 As proof, he cites 
the numerous genocides and atrocities around the world that have occurred since the Holocaust. 
Rieff is surely correct that the prevalence of Holocaust memory and education in Germany and 
elsewhere did not prevent the Cambodian genocide of the Khmer Rouge or the Rwandan genocide 
of 1994 or the ethnic violence that riddled the Balkans in the 1990s. In reality, it is easy to cite 
such horrific examples to prove that memory is not preventive, but that is only because it is much 
1 David Rieff, In Praise of Forgetting: Historical Memory and Its Ironies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 39.
2 Aleida Assman, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization: Functions, Media, Archives (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011); Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); 
Marianne Hirsch, Family Frames: Photography, Narrative, and Postmemory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1997); Marianne Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory: Writing and Visual Culture After the Holocaust. (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2012); Andreas Huyssen, Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Elizabeth Jelin, State Repression and the Labors of Memory, trans. Judy Rein 
and Marcial Godoy-Anativia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003); Dominick LaCapra, History and 
Memory after Auschwitz (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1998); Dominick LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma, 2nd 
ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014); Alison Landsberg, Prosthetic Memory: The Transformation of 
American Remembrance in the Age of Mass Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004); Michael Rothberg, 
Multidirectional Memory Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2009); Diana Taylor, The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2003); James Edward Young, The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1993); James E. Young, The Art of Memory: Holocaust Memorial in History (New York: Prestel, 
1994); James E. Young, At Memory’s Edge: After-Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary Art and Architecture (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).
3 Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux Des Mémoire,” Representations 26, no. Spring (1989), 7–24.
4 Rieff, In Praise of Forgetting, 83.
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more difficult to cite the counterexamples, where active remembrance of the past has succeeded 
at preventing atrocities. It is impossible to prove a non-event, and Rieff takes full advantage of 
that impossibility. But this fact does not mean that memory has no preventive potential. After 
all, Germany and the rest of Western Europe have not perpetrated such atrocities since the end 
of WWII. When I mentioned this fact to Rieff at a conference in Worcester, Massachusetts,5 
Rieff responded by stating that it is very rare that one country perpetrates two genocides, and 
therefore it is not proof enough to assert Germany’s non-repetition of atrocities as evidence to the 
potential preventive effects of memory. Rieff clearly does not understand that history of genocide 
is widely understood as one of the greatest risk factors for future genocides, a point to which I 
will return shortly. Moreover, he has conveniently forgotten that Germany did, in fact, perpetrate 
another genocide before the Holocaust, when it wiped out a vast majority of the Herero people 
and around 50% of the Nama people of present-day Namibia in the first decade of the twentieth 
century. Furthermore, it is memory of the violent conflict of WWII and the Holocaust that led 
to the formation of the European Union, which, for all its flaws, has undoubtedly succeeded at 
preventing its member states from killing each other—not a small feat given the almost unceasing 
series of wars and skirmishes that filled the region for centuries prior to the founding of the EU. It 
is also hard to believe that Germany’s response to the current Syrian refugee crisis is not in some 
way related to a collective memory of the refugees created by Germany during the Third Reich. Of 
all the EU countries, Germany has accepted by far the largest number of asylum seekers, pursuing 
refuge from atrocities in their home country. Other factors are, of course, also at play. But is it so 
far-fetched to think that memory of past violence does not play some contributing role here? 
Rieff is indeed correct to say that memory is not always and only preventive. In fact, memory 
can be used to encourage violence, rather than deter it. The past has provided ample justification 
for enduring social hostilities or outright violence in places like the former Yugoslavia, Israel-
Palestine, and the Great Lakes Region of Africa. As I will explain shortly, memory is, by my 
definition, the way that the past influences the present and future. Some societies instrumentalize 
that past to do wonderful things; others use it to rationalize destruction. But to assert, as Rieff 
does, that the answer in these countries where the past is being used to stoke further violence is 
to forget is patently absurd. At times, memory is used to prevent. At others, memory is used to 
incite. But one thing is certain: memory is. And to expect citizens of post-atrocity societies to forget 
a period of recent violence willfully is as much an example of “magical thinking” as Rieff believes 
the preventive aspects of memory are. Additionally, it is worth noting that, all too often, those 
who most adamantly cry for “forgetting” and “moving forward” are not, themselves, victims, but 
those who most benefit personally from large-scale oblivion. In these cases, “forgetting” becomes a 
euphemism for outright denial, which, as Gregory Stanton has famously indicated, is itself one of 
the constituent stages of genocide.6
In all post-atrocity societies that utilize various strategies to deal with the past and (hopefully) 
avert the return of mass violence in the future, these strategies work best when they 1) are motivated 
by an intention to prevent violence and create social cohesion; 2) are supported by adequate financial, 
social, and political resources; and 3) occur as part of a larger, more comprehensive strategy of 
dealing with the past. That is to say: memory can certainly fail when it is mal-intentioned or under-
supported, just as it can succeed in contributing to prevention when it is directed toward redress, 
acknowledgement, and unity. In other words, although memory of past violence can certainly be 
manipulated to justify further violence or social division, it can also be preventive when we work for 
it to be. But this leads to a much bigger, more important question--and the focus of this article: How 
exactly can we ensure that memory of the past leads to cohesion, rather than division? Or, rather, 
how can we remember in order to prevent?
In this article I illustrate the various ways that memory of past genocides and atrocity crimes 
can contribute to the prevention of future violent conflict. I begin by offering a brief theoretical 
5 David Rieff, “Public Lecture” (Emerging Expertise: Holding Accountability Accountable, Clark University, 2017).
6 I owe this last point of the connection between forgetting and denial to Elazar Barkan, who spoke on these issues during 
a panel at the Kean University 2017 Summer Institute, Large-Scale Violence and Its Aftermaths, on 25 June 2017; Gregory 
Stanton, Eight Stages of Genocide (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2008).
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overview of memory, what it means in this context, and the role it plays in post-atrocity societies. 
Next, I draw upon the vast research on risk factors for genocide and mass atrocities in order to 
provide a framework for thinking about atrocity prevention as mitigating the risk factors associated 
with conflict history, social fragmentation, and governance. Finally, I offer an array of examples 
of memory initiatives that mitigate one or more of these risk factors, thus reducing the risk of 
atrocity. In the end, I argue that, indeed, memory is not always preventive. It can be used to justify 
horrific violence. But when a concerted and deliberate effort is made to deal with the past with the 
intention of reducing the hostilities that led to conflict, memory can be a powerful force in the fight 
to prevent genocide and other atrocities.
Memory vs. History
To understand the preventive capacity of memory, one must first understand what exactly memory 
is. Clearly, memory has many different meanings, ranging from the recollection of individual 
experience to the reality of “sedimented experience,” through which the past guides our actions 
in the world at an often subconscious level.7 When scholars and practitioners discuss memory in 
the context of post-atrocity societies, however, they are most often referring to interpretations of 
the past that impact the present. It is this form of memory that I address in this article. In his book, 
Rieff quotes French historian Jacques Le Goff, who writes that “memory only seeks to rescue the 
past in order to serve the present and future.”8 Rieff goes on to write that “exercises in collective 
historical remembrance far more closely resemble myth on one side and political propaganda on 
the other than they do history.”9 Both Rieff and Le Goff cite this instrumentalization of the past to 
prove the weaknesses and dangers of memory. In reality, they are right about what memory is, but 
not so right about what memory does. 
Indeed, history and memory are not the same. If we think about History (with a capital H) 
as what actually happened in the past, then memory is the way that past influences the present 
and the future. Or, rather, to evoke Andreas Huyssen, memory is the way the past is present.10 To 
complicate this a bit, however, what we call history is very often an aspect of memory. Dimitri 
Nikulin writes, “[M]emory is incapable of adequately representing the past and in fact need not do 
so, since any act of recollection is an active reconstruction, which is a constructive interpretation 
or production of the past.”11 We have all heard the expression, “History is written by the winners.” 
In this case, we are not actually speaking of History (with a capital H, meaning what actually 
happened), but history (with a lowercase h): the version of the past that is accepted, at the present 
moment, at least, as the definitive “truth” of what occurred in the past. This “truth,” however, is 
never the whole truth. It is a selective recounting of the past, told from the perspective of those in 
power. For every event recounted in a history textbook, there are millions of stories that are not 
there…and they are usually the stories of the dispossessed, the vanquished, the oppressed, the 
poor, or, in the basest of terms, the “losers” of history. What we call history, then, is very often a 
version of memory that has reached a certain level of consensus that places it beyond the boundaries 
of dispute. In other words, as Henry Kissinger put it, “History is the memory of states.”12 But if 
history can also be a version of memory, then how can we think more deeply about memory?
In State Repression and the Labors of Memory, Argentinean memory scholar Elizabeth Jelin offers 
three guiding principles when it comes to thinking about memory.13 First, she emphasizes that 
memories are always subjective processes.14 The fact that Jelin does not only stress that memory is 
7 Christian Gudehus, “On the Significance of the Past for Present and Future Action,” in Theorizing Social Memories: 
Concepts and Contexts, ed. Gerd Sebald and Jatin Wagle (London: Routledge, 2016), 84–97.
8 Qtd. in Rieff, In Praise of Forgetting, 22.
9 Ibid.
10 Huyssen, Present Pasts.
11 Dmitri Nikulin, “Introduction: Memory in Recollection of Itself,” in Memory: A History, ed. Dmitri Nikulin (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), 25.
12 Qtd. in Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the United States (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), 9.
13 Jelin, State Repression and the Labors of Memory.
14 Ibid., xv.
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subjective, but that it is a process is essential. It is through the process of memory-making that new 
subjectivities are formed. This process can absolutely lead to the formation of hostile or violent 
subjectivities, but, when done in a more productive way, can create a conscientious population 
that works actively against the recurrence of violence in the future. One aspect of this process is 
the implementation of memory initiatives, and it is here where the preventive potential of memory 
arises. I return to memory initiatives later in this article.
Second, Jelin writes that memories are always “the object of disputes, conflicts, and struggles.”15 
She continues, “This premise involves the need to focus attention on the active and productive role 
of participants in these struggles. It is they who generate meanings of the past, framed by the 
power relations in which their actions are embedded in the present.”16 I stated before that memory 
is, but it is perhaps better to say that memory will be. In post-atrocity societies, it is inevitable that 
the violence of the past will be remembered on a grand scale. How that memory develops will 
be influenced significantly by the members of that society who advocate for remembrance of the 
past—the people at the vanguard of public memory production, who Jennifer Jordan refers to as 
memorial entrepreneurs.17 Those memory-makers could be like the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, 
the group of Argentinean women who continue to demand—peacefully, yet forcefully—the return 
of their disappeared children, bringing forth their message of human rights for all as they do so. 
But those memory-makers could also be like the leadership of Republika Srpska and Serbia in the 
Balkans, who continue to evoke the past to justify antagonistic and often genocidal rhetoric against 
Bosniaks in the present. 
The fact that memories are disputed and contested is not actually, on its own, a bad thing. In 
fact, as I will argue later, a society that allows for an active contestation of the past may even be less 
prone to atrocities than those with a specific version of the past that is accepted whole cloth by all. 
The problem comes when people, like Rieff, believe that only one version of the past can and should 
exist. This assumption is understandable. After all, in post-atrocity societies, we constantly refer 
to the phenomenon of collective memory, a concept developed by Maurice Halbwachs to describe 
the fact that all individual memories are formed through the social framework of which the 
individual is a part.18 But the grammatical singular of collective memory is deceptive. As memory 
scholar James E. Young argues, it is better to think in terms of collected memory: “the many discrete 
memories that are gathered into common memorial spaces and assigned common meaning.”19 
Here, Young refers in different words to the same process of “disputes, conflicts, and struggles” 
that Jelin evokes. Collective or cultural memory is formed through the interaction of millions of 
individual memories, and often those interactions are not without contention. When this process 
is intentionally directed toward the goals of social cohesion or atrocity prevention, however, it can 
forge a relationship with the past that brings people together rather than divides them.20 
Finally, Jelin writes that, when examining memory, one must recognize that all memory is 
specific to the place and moment in which it exists. She writes that “meanings attached to the 
past change over time and are part of larger, complex social and political scenarios.”21 Here, we 
arrive at the point that Rieff most bristles against: the instrumentalization of memory for political 
purposes. Memory certainly always exists within the political sphere, but so, too, does history. 
When we recognize the contextuality of memory, however, it allows for two things. First, it helps 
us understand that memory is always related to power and forged through relations of power. 
This can, at times, be good for some, and bad for others. Either way, the fact that memory is 
contextually specific means that it is not permanent—which leads to the second point. This non-
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Jennifer A. Jordan, Structures of Memory: Understanding Urban Change in Berlin and Beyond (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2006).
18 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, trans. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
19 Young, The Texture of Memory, xi.
20 Maddison, Sarah. 2016. Conflict Transformation and Reconciliation: Multi-level Challenges in Deeply Divided Societies. New 
York: Routledge.
21 Jelin, State Repression and the Labors of Memory, xv.
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permanence of memory allows for the possibility of changing the memory narratives that are 
being instrumentalized to perpetrate further violence or create social division. It also serves as a 
challenge, however, because it means that the process of building a preventive memory culture is a 
perpetual one. Social actors must continue to work at this process, as the risk always exists for the 
past to be instrumentalized to sow the seeds of strife, rather than of community.
This potential of memory to change is exemplified in Edward S. Casey’s concept of public 
memory. Casey develops this term to describe how different memories and memory narratives join 
together in the public sphere in order “to guarantee the intimate tie between past and future.”22 
According to Casey, public memory is distinct from social memory and collective memory. He 
thinks of social memory as memories that are shared by people within the same kinship group, 
geographical area, or those dedicated to “a common project.”23 Likewise, he thinks of collective 
memory as the phenomenon whereby people who have no association can recall the same event, 
despite never having known each other.24 For Casey, collective memory describes the reality that 
different groups can relate to the same past event without having to relate to each other; the event 
supersedes the people remembering it. Public memory, on the other hand, is when various groups 
of people come together in the public sphere through the memory of a certain event. Casey writes 
that collective memory “allows for co-remembering without co-reminiscing and for the massive 
convergence of those who remember the same thing without knowing each other personally.”25 
Collective memory becomes public memory when those diverse groups of people come together in 
space, time, and body to remember that past together. Whereas collective memory does not require 
that the rememberers be together, public memory demands it. 
If we accept Casey’s proposition, then, we could say that all of the instances where Rieff cites 
the failure of memory could easily be viewed instead as instances where collective memory failed 
to bring people together, to transform into public memory. To take the most obvious example, 
everyone in Bosnia and Herzegovina who lived through it remembers the horrific violence of the 
1990s. To date, that memory of past violence has only led to greater social hostility among the 
country’s various ethnic groups. Using Casey’s understanding of memory, however, we could 
argue that the reason it has failed to bring healing or to prevent social fragmentation is because not 
only has it not transformed into public memory by bringing all sectors of Bosnian society together 
to remember the past, but it has also failed at even converting into collective memory. What exists 
in Bosnia today is what Casey would call social memory. Each ethnic group has its own version 
of the past. Each sees itself as the victim of the others. And there is little place in the public sphere 
where these different groups interact or come together to form a common, public memory. 
Public memory requires bodies to come together in public space, which is why we must 
think of memory not only as something cognitive or psychological, but also as something 
embodied and performed.26 It is without doubt the case that memory of the past has been and 
is being used in certain places to justify radical intolerance and unspeakable violence. But 
for every instance where that is the case, we can find a dozen alternative cases where memory 
creates cohesion, positive change, and a less violent society. It is often easier, as Rieff does, to 
point to the cases where memory does the former. I now want to turn to instances where memory 
does the latter. 
Memory and Prevention
To begin a discussion on the preventive capacity of memory, it is essential to acknowledge the white 
elephant in the room: proving the preventive capacity of anything is incredibly difficult, especially 
for those who are skeptical of prevention discourse from the start. To offer incontrovertible evidence 
that an atrocity has been prevented, one would need to prove that an atrocity was undoubtedly set 
22 Edward Casey, “Public Memory in Place and Time,” in Framing Public Memory, ed. Kendall R. Phillips (Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 2004), 17.
23 Ibid., 21.
24 Ibid., 23.
25 Ibid., 25.
26 Connerton, How Societies Remember.
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to take place and, owing to some action, was prevented from taking place. In most cases, however, 
it is impossible to prove a non-event. Nevertheless, what we can do is look to the extensive research 
we have relating to the risk factors for atrocity and see what memory initiatives have successfully 
mitigated one or more of these factors. 
The last decade has seen a proliferation of early-warning systems that draw from qualitative 
and quantitative data to predict the risk for genocide, state-led mass killing, and/or atrocities. Some 
of the most well-known and respected of these systems include the Atrocity Forecasting Project out 
of the University of Sydney27, the United Nation’s Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes,28 the 
Minorities at Risk Project out of the University of Maryland,29 the United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum’s Early Warning Project,30 and Barbara Harff’s model of risk factors for genocide and 
politicide.31 Each of these systems utilizes a varying array of risk factors and data to measure risk 
for atrocity. In Confronting Evil: Engaging Our Responsibility to Prevent Genocide,32 social psychologist 
and genocide prevention scholar James Waller performs a thorough analysis of the wide swath of 
risk factors identified in these systems to compile a comprehensive list of factors that draws from 
the strengths of each. The result is a list of twenty risk factors that cut across many of these early-
warning systems and that fall into four different categories, which I discuss below. I posit that 
memory initiatives can be identified as preventive when they succeed at mitigating or eliminating 
any of the identifiable risk factors that lead to atrocity. As such, I plan to demonstrate how memory 
initiatives in a selection of post-atrocity societies have succeeded at mitigating these risk factors, 
and therefore have made the recurrence of violence less likely.
Waller’s risk-assessment model indicates twenty risk factors for atrocity that spread across four 
different categories: governance, conflict history, economic conditions, and social fragmentation. 
Each of these categories contains five specific risk factors that fall within its purview. For the 
purposes of this article, I will focus on the role that memory initiatives have played and can play 
in mitigating the risk factors associated with three of these categories: conflict history, governance, 
and social fragmentation. I take my definition of memory initiative from Impunity Watch’s Policy 
Brief on “Guiding Principles of Memorialization,” which defines a memory initiative as 
any activity that aims to commemorate or enhance understanding of a conflictive past, 
including—but not limited to—the erection and maintenance of memorials and monuments, 
the operation of museums and exhibits, traditional ceremonies and rituals, musical and 
theatrical performances on relevant topics, the running of educational, awareness-raising, 
dialogue and remembrance programs, the teaching of history, and the gathering and 
preservation of information.33
This definition offered by the policy brief demonstrates the vast gamut of memory initiatives that 
exist. In the remainder of this article, I focus on an array of memory initiatives to evaluate their 
capacity to mitigate risk factors for atrocity. By offering specific examples of memory spaces and 
practices in diverse post-atrocity societies, I demonstrate how memory initiatives can and have 
mitigated the risk factors associated with conflict history, social fragmentation, and governance.
27 University of Sydney, “Atrocity Forecasting Project,” accessed August 21, 2017, http://sydney.edu.au/arts/research/
atrocity_forecasting/.
28 United Nations, “Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention” (UN Office of the Special Advisers 
on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, 2014).
29 University of Maryland, “Minorities at Risk Project,” accessed June 21, 2017, http://www.mar.umd.edu/.
30 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Early Warning Project — United States Holocaust Memorial Museum,” 
accessed June 21, 2017, https://www.ushmm.org/confront-genocide/how-to-prevent-genocide/early-warning-project.
31 Barbara Harff, “Assessing Risk of Genocide and Politicide,” in Peace and Conflict: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-
Determination Movements, and Democracy, ed. Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr (College Park: University of 
Maryland Press, 2005), 57–61.
32 James Waller, Confronting Evil: Engaging Our Responsibility to Prevent Genocide (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2016).
33 Impunity Watch, “Policy Brief: Guiding Principles of Memorialization,” (Impunity Watch, January 2013), 3.
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Conflict History
Perhaps the primary risk factor that memory initiatives as a whole mitigate are those associated 
with conflict history. Across numerous risk assessment models, including Waller’s, one of the 
clearest risk factors for atrocity is the existence of a past atrocity.34 The reasons why conflict history 
presents such a dangerous risk factor for atrocity is in dispute. Scott Straus highlights several 
potential reasons: perhaps it is because the former implementation of systematic discrimination 
and mass killing conditions leaders to see it as a viable option, or perhaps it has more to do with 
a combination of past violence and impunity in its aftermath, signaling to perpetrators that such 
actions will not result in punishment.35 I tend to lean toward the argument that past systematic 
discrimination resulting in mass killing demonstrates the potential by a society at large to write 
off certain groups as outside the realm of moral responsibility—a point to which I will return. 
Whatever the reason, the risk factors associated with prior genocides or politicides are clear. 
Unfortunately, this risk factor is one that cannot ever be completely eliminated; if a society 
experienced a genocide, nothing can make that genocide go away. In this case, however, there 
are ways of mitigating the power of this risk factor. Waller writes, “[C]onflict history in a state or 
region is a nonmodifiable risk factor for the onset of future genocide—if it happened, it cannot be 
unhappened. What can be modified, however, are the ways in which that history is remembered, 
taught, processed, and understood.”36 In other words, conflict history presents varying degrees of 
risk based on the way it manifests in public memory—the way it functions in contemporary discourse 
and practice. 
For this reason, memory is just one aspect of a much bigger process that every post-atrocity 
society must face in the aftermath of large-scale, systematic violence. A single word emerged in 
post-WWII Germany to describe this process: Vergangenheitsbewältigung, which literally means, 
“coming to terms with the past.” Today, however, memory is considered a process that is both a 
part of and exceeds the framework of transitional justice. Transitional justice (TJ) is the term that has 
emerged to describe the ways a society deals with the human rights abuses of its past. Even though 
its name may imply that it involves only judicial means of dealing with the past (e.g. the criminal 
prosecution of perpetrators), TJ refers both to the juridical and non-juridical means by which a 
society addresses past atrocities and systematic human rights violations. As TJ has expanded as 
a field over the past several decades, certain keywords or themes have become associated with 
its processes. Each of these words extends beyond the political and the pragmatic. Indeed, each 
has a kind of moral or ethical value attached to it, as well. These words inevitably come up in the 
aftermath of mass atrocity, and they highlight what many people feel is at stake when it comes 
to dealing with the past. They are words like truth, justice, and reconciliation. They also include 
memory. 
Yet, the notion of memory and public memory formation also exceeds the framework of TJ—a 
rubric that focuses most especially on the role the state plays in dealing with the past.37 Indeed, 
when it comes to memory, the state is not the only, or even the most important, actor. The idea of 
remembering the past in order to honor those who were lost and to guarantee the non-recurrence of 
violence, however, is central to TJ. TJ is traditionally framed as a backward-looking process, which 
seeks to address past harms and to initiate reforms based on what occurred in the past. There is 
a growing literature, however, that depicts TJ equally as a forward-looking process that, through 
mechanisms like truth commissions, criminal prosecutions, institutional reform, and various 
acts of reparations, creates a society that is more equipped to prevent future violence through an 
34 Harff, “Assessing Risk of Genocide and Politicide”; Waller, Confronting Evil; Scott Straus, Fundamentals of Genocide and 
Mass Atrocity Prevention (Washington, DC: US Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2016); B.E. Goldsmith et al., “Forecasting 
the Onset of Genocide and Politicide,” Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 4 (2013), 437–52.
35 Straus, Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention.
36 Waller, Confronting Evil, 162.
37 In almost every transitional justice process, civil society has an incredibly influential role to play. Indeed, it is often 
the driving force for transitional justice measures. In the end, however, the actual policies and mechanisms of TJ are 
largely implemented by the state, not by civil society.
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engagement with the past in what Waller refers to as downstream prevention.38 Broadly speaking, 
then, TJ is a process to mitigate the risk factors of conflict history.
One category of memory initiative that both fits within and exceeds this framework of TJ is 
the creation of sites of memory and memorials. This vast category of memory initiatives includes, 
among other things, former sites of atrocity, memorials, monuments, and memory museums. 
Memorials and monuments can be an aspect of transitional justice in a number of ways. For one, 
they can serve as a form of symbolic reparations to victims of violence and oppression. By creating 
official sites of memory that honor those who suffered or died during periods of extreme violence, 
the state can acknowledge and legitimize that suffering. In this way, memorials can provide a sense 
of justice, giving victims a feeling that their suffering is recognized. Memorials can also be a site for 
truth-telling, where the story of what happened in the past can be transmitted to new generations. 
Sites of memory can be potential sites of reconciliation, in that they can provide a space for groups 
to come together around shared or even contested narratives of the past. 
Political scientist Louis Bickford argues, however, that memorials do not only serve as a 
component of transitional justice by offering redress for past violations of human rights. Thoughtfully 
constructed sites of memory also play a role in preventing future violence by reducing some of 
the risk factors presented by conflict history.39 According to the authors of Memorialization and 
Democracy: State Policy and Civic Action, a report from the 2007 conference held in Santiago, Chile, 
which brought together memory scholars and practitioners from around the world to discuss the 
relationship between spaces of memory and democracy:
Memorials whose goal is to prevent the repetition of past abuses will ask us not only to 
remember the victims, but to look inward and think critically about our history and 
what forces within society or ourselves unleashed the demons of war, racism, or political 
oppression. If deliberately designed as open forums, they also have the potential to be part 
of broader democratic reconstruction by fostering dialogue that helps citizens come to terms 
with the past and understand its relation to the present and future. Memorials conceived of 
as more than sacred space or symbolic reparations can thus form an integral part of the long-
term objectives of transitional justice.40 
When developed within the framework of a conscientious strategy to relate the past to the present 
and future, memory sites can mitigate the risk factors associated with conflict history by framing 
the past as not fully past and by creating spaces for active engagement with that history.
One clear risk factor that sites of memory can serve to mitigate is what Waller calls the presence 
of past cultural trauma. Just as an individual who has experienced a traumatic event can be haunted 
by that event in a way that impedes his or her ability to function positively in the present, societies 
that have experienced a traumatic past are often impeded by the ghosts of that past violence. 
Sites of memory can provide a venue for what Dominick LaCapra calls the “working through” of 
this past cultural trauma.41 According to LaCapra, who elaborates upon the concept of Sigmund 
Freud, trauma must be “worked through” productively in order to prevent it from “acting out,” 
that is, from constantly re-manifesting as a violent, damaging force.42 LaCapra writes, “[Working 
through] means coming to terms with the trauma, including its details, and critically engaging the 
tendency to act out the past and even to recognize why it may be necessary and even in certain 
38 Waller, Confronting Evil; Clara Ramírez-Barat, “Introduction: Transitional Justice and the Public Sphere,” in Beyond 
Outreach: Transitional Justice, Culture, and Society, ed. Clara Ramírez-Barat (New York: SSRC, 2013), 26–45; Alexander 
Laban Hinton, Transitional Justice: Global Mechanisms and Local Realities after Genocide and Mass Violence (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2011); Pablo de Greiff, “Justice and Reparations,” in Transitional Justice: Handbook 
for Latin America, ed. Félix Reátegui (New York: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2011), 377–408.
39 Louis Bickford, “Memoryworks/Memory Works,” in Transitional Justice, Culture, and Society: Beyond Outreach, ed. Clara 
Ramírez-Barat (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2014), 491–528.
40 Sebastian Brett et al., “Memorialization and Democracy” (Santiago: FLACSO Chile, International Center for Transitional 
Justice, and International Coalition of Historic Museums of Conscience, June 20, 2007), 6.
41 La Capra, History and Memory after Auschwitz; La Capra, Writing History, Writing Trauma.
42 Ibid.
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respects desirable or at least compelling.”43 Although this model, as originally conceived, deals 
primarily with individual trauma, Waller’s risk assessment model demonstrates how this metaphor 
also applies on the societal level. If a society that has experienced past cultural trauma does not 
proactively work through that history, it remains a risk factor for the re-emergence of violence—
that is, the “acting out” of that cultural trauma through renewed acts of physical destruction. 
Sites of memory have a real role to play in the working through of cultural trauma, and 
therefore in the mitigation of atrocity risk. They can do this in a number of ways. First, sites of 
memory can ensure that the truth about the past is widely known and understood, a first step in 
working through past trauma. Memorial museums are one prevalent and effective type of memory 
site whose primary goal is to inform the public about the facts of what actually occurred. The 
Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Santiago, Chile, is one example of such a museum. 
Inaugurated in 2010, this museum serves both as a memorial to the victims of oppression under 
Augusto Pinochet’s military dictatorship (1973-90), and as a museum providing a comprehensive 
historical overview of the events that occurred during this period of violence, as well as those that 
preceded and followed it. According to the Museum’s website:
The Museum of Memory and Human Rights is a space designed to give visibility to the 
human rights violations committed by the Chilean State between 1973 and 1990, to dignify 
the victims and their families, and to stimulate reflection and debate on the importance of 
respect and tolerance, so that these acts will never again be repeated.44
This mission statement demonstrates how the museum serves a dual purpose. By informing visitors 
about what exactly occurred during the period of violence, it is simultaneously encouraging a 
working through by, in their words, “[stimulating] reflection and debate on the importance of 
respect and tolerance.”45 In other words, the museum serves to bridge the gap between the past and 
present, asking what lessons can be learned from the past to ensure that it does not repeat itself.
Sites of memory can also aid in the working through of past trauma by literally transforming 
former sites of death into sites of life and community. Some of the most powerful sites of memory 
are former sites of atrocity that have been converted into memory spaces, for examples, the former 
concentration camps of Europe and the former detention and torture centers of Latin America. 
When these sites of death become active and vibrant sites of memory, the spaces that once 
worked to produce death are transformed into spaces that both educate visitors about the past 
and hopefully produce within them a personal commitment to preventing the recurrence of such 
violence. Examples abound of such creative uses of memory space. 
The District Six Museum in Cape Town, South Africa, is located within the bounds of the 
District Six National Heritage Site, which saw the forced displacement of tens of thousands 
of mostly black South Africans during Apartheid. Today, the District Six Museum educates 
visitors about the history of Apartheid, using the story of District Six to tell the broader story 
of this oppressive regime as a whole. It is not only a place of history, however. The directors of 
the District Six Museum have created an array of programs that ensure the lessons of Apartheid 
are not solely those of a distant past; rather, the threat of race-based oppression is ever-present 
and must be actively resisted. Through oral history projects, South African youth are trained in 
oral history methodologies so that they record the stories of the generations that lived through 
Apartheid. Projects like this help to ensure the preservation of memory related to this past. The 
museum also hosts a number of projects that more directly connect the history of Apartheid with 
current issues of racism and human rights abuses. The Anti-Racism and Human Rights Project, co-
organized with the British Council in 2006/2007, offered training to youth on issues of racism and 
human rights, before helping the young participants to develop and implement community-based 
projects addressing these issues in their own communities. Likewise, the 2006 Zenit Exchange 
43 LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma, 144.
44 “Sobre El Museo: Museo de La Memoria Y Los Derechos Humanos,” accessed June 21, 2017, https://ww3.
museodelamemoria.cl/sobre-el-museo/; my translation.
45 Ibid.
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Programme with the Malmö Museum of Sweden organized international exchanges for students 
to “[investigate] global issues of poverty, unfair trade, gender, racism, human rights, health and 
welfare.”46 Through programs like these, the memory workers of the District Six Museum connect 
“then” with “now”, demonstrating that learning about past violence can also lead to action and 
social transformation in the present. The projects created by these youth, then, serve to mitigate 
in some way another risk factor of atrocity: records of serious violations of international human rights 
and laws.47 According to the UN’s Framework for Analysis of Atrocity Crimes, “Societies that have 
a history of violence and serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law 
or atrocity crimes, or where these are currently taking place, can be more prone to further atrocity 
crimes.”48 The atrocity crimes of Apartheid are an historical fact that cannot be altered. The projects 
initiated by the participants in these programs, however, use the lessons of Apartheid to address 
current violations of human rights or the unequal access to goods and services; in the process, they 
curtail the effects of this risk factor, thus making future atrocity crimes less likely.
These examples from the District Six Museum illustrate how sites of memory on their own can 
do very little to mitigate the risks for atrocity. Rather, it is how these sites are used that determines 
their preventive potential. One of the productive ways to ensure that a memorial space remains 
alive and active—a space that pushes memory of the past into the everyday so that it can be 
preventive, rather than a space that sequesters the past away, keeping the discomforts of prior 
violence out of sight and mind—is to make sure these sites of memory themselves become venues 
for other memory initiatives.49 This idea is supported by Judy Barsalou and Victoria Baxter when 
they call for a move away from “old memorial and museum traditions of creating static spaces.” 
They continue, quoting Liz Ševčenko, “The goal is to make or preserve places for ‘performances 
of democracy, not static representation of national identity.’”50 Spaces of memory can be more 
successfully preventive when they are also spaces for civil society activism, for the coming together 
of dissenting groups in historical dialogue, for the transmission of memory to future generations, 
and for the utilization of the arts to keep these spaces full of life, rather than only full of past 
death. The one point I hope to emphasize here is that memorial spaces on their own are completely 
insufficient. The spaces must be activated and filled with the bodies of rememberers, who must in 
turn be inspired and activated by the space to go forth and do the difficult, yet necessary work of 
prevention. In other words, the preventive capacity of memory initiatives is not only related to how 
they address the risk factors related to conflict history, but also how they bring people together in 
a way that addresses a second category of risk factors for atrocities: social fragmentation.
Social Fragmentation
Another capacity of memory initiatives for the prevention of atrocity involves the mitigation of 
risks associated with what Waller refers to as social fragmentation. During periods of genocide 
and mass atrocity, two processes that are common across almost all cases are the fragmentation 
and atomization of civil society.51 Fragmentation involves the breaking down of societies into 
specific identity groups so that these groups eventually cease to interact or associate with each 
other. During the Holocaust, for instance, Jews and other “undesirable” social groups were 
isolated from the larger German society. In Rwanda, Hutus and Tutsis—two groups that had lived 
together in relative harmony for many decades before the 1960s—reached levels of fragmentation 
46 “District Six Museum | Education,” accessed June 21, 2017, http://www.districtsix.co.za/Content/Education/Learners/
BalulekaYouth/Background/index.php.
47 Waller, Confronting Evil, 170.
48 United Nations, “Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes,” 11.
49 Kerry Whigham, “Filling the Absence: The Re-Embodiment of Sites of Mass Atrocity and the Practices They Generate,” 
Museum and Society 12, no. 2 (2014), 88–103.
50 Judy Barsalou and Victoria Baxter, “The Urge to Remember: The Role of Memorials in Social Reconstruction and 
Transitional Justice” (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, January 2007), 14.
51 Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1970); Hannah Arendt, The Origins of 
Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968); Guillermo O’Donnell, Counterpoints: Selected Essays on 
Authoritarianism and Democratization (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999); Waller, Confronting Evil.
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that allowed for the attempted destruction of one of these groups. In turn, atomization refers to 
the breaking down of even these separate identity groups into sole individuals who feel so alone 
and so threatened by perpetrator regimes that they fear even coming together with other victims 
to organize against the structures working against them. Hannah Arendt points out that this 
atomization is particularly indicative of totalitarian regimes, like the Soviet Union.52 Argentinean 
political scientist Guillermo O’Donnell articulates how this same type of atomization was present 
in the military dictatorships of Latin America.53 When civil society is not only fragmented, but also 
atomized, it becomes incredibly difficult to prevent the rise of genocidal or atrocity regimes or 
resist their exercise of power once they have already taken control. 
A fragmented and atomized civil society is a notable risk factor for atrocity. Waller writes, 
“Where social cohesion can unite a people and strengthen a society, social fragmentation splinters 
a people, reduces the resiliency of a society, and places it at increased risk for violent or genocidal 
conflict.”54 Likewise, a society within which different identity groups interact and are able to 
organize collectively to express their desires and exercise their rights is less likely to fall victim 
to genocide or atrocity. According to the UN Framework for Analysis, societies become more 
resilient and less likely to commit atrocities by “supporting a strong and diverse civil society and 
a pluralistic media.”55 Sites of memory can play an integral role in undoing the fragmentation of 
groups and encouraging social cohesion around shared memories of the past. 
If one of the principal goals of perpetrator regimes is to fragment and isolate civil society 
groups, oftentimes positioning them against each other, sites of memory can be sites where some of 
these fragmented groups can both literally and figuratively come together again. Sites of memory 
provide physical spaces within which those affected and torn apart by that violence can unite again, 
leading to new levels of social cohesion, and thus mitigating some of the risk factors associated with 
social fragmentation. In other words, sites of memory can be key components in the production of 
Casey’s concept of public memory: memory produced through the coming together of individuals 
in the public sphere in order to remember or confront the past collectively. 
During Argentina’s last military dictatorship (1976-83), most public interaction was 
criminalized. Labor unions and political parties were declared illegal, and even stopping on the 
street to speak with someone was suspect. There was little to no room in the public sphere for 
individuals to come together and resist the violent regime. When the dictatorship fell, the public 
sphere was reopened, and Argentina began a vigorous, though brief, campaign of what today we 
would call transitional justice, including the creation of the world’s first truth commission56 and the 
prosecution of the architects of the dictatorship. Nonetheless, the threat of another military coup 
soon overwhelmed these efforts, and for around two decades the country experienced a culture of 
impunity where the crimes of the past went unpunished and largely unacknowledged. This shifted 
in the early 2000s, however, with the election of Nestor Kirchner as president. Kirchner and his 
government reopened the books on the past and began again the work of dealing with its legacy. 
One of the key moments in this turning back to the past came on the 28th anniversary of 
the military coup, 24 March 2004, when Kirchner visited the Escuela Superior Mecánica de la 
Armada (ESMA), the dictatorship’s largest former detention and torture center, where some 5000 
Argentineans were tortured and killed. Until that day, the site was still under military control. 
In a gesture still remembered and discussed today, Kirchner had a soldier remove from the wall 
the paintings of the leaders of the dictatorship, before opening the gates of ESMA to the public, 
declaring it an official site of memory.57 Today, ESMA hosts the official space of memory in the 
52 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism.
53 O’Donnell, Counterpoints: Selected Essays.
54 Waller, Confronting Evil, 181.
55 United Nations, “Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes,” 3.
56 Some point to Uganda’s 1974 Commission into the Disappearances of People as the first truth commission. Although 
this may be true, this commission was established by Idi Amin to account for the people that he and his regime killed. 
Furthermore, this truth commission did not stop further killing from happening, but occurred within the time-frame 
of the perpetrator regime. As such, it is difficult to think of this as a real example of transitional justice.
57 Memoria Abierta, Memorias En La Ciudad: Señales Del Terrorismo de Estado En Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 2009); 
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building where these victims were tortured and imprisoned. The complex also includes a cultural 
center that features art exhibitions, theatrical performances, concerts, conferences, a bookstore, and 
a café. Furthermore, the majority of the other buildings on the premises were given to civil society 
organizations working toward the promotion of memory and human rights. In other words, this 
site of violence and death has now been transformed into a space of life. Argentineans visit the space 
every day, not only to remember the violent past, but also to work actively toward the prevention 
of such violence in the future. By including cultural events and a café in the space, ESMA has 
also become a space of community. During the period of the dictatorship, Argentinean society 
was completely fragmented and atomized by the violent regime. Today, the site that represented 
the pinnacle of this violence is a site for bringing together the people who were once its victims, 
undoing some risk factors associated with social fragmentation in the process.58 
The example of ESMA demonstrates how sites of memory can literally bring together 
fragmented groups, thus mitigating some of the risk factors associated with fragmentation. Sites 
of memory can also mitigate the risk factors of social fragmentation in more figurative ways. One 
of the principal reasons that social fragmentation is a risk for genocide and atrocity is because it 
contributes to excluding groups from what genocide scholar Helen Fein calls the moral universe 
or universe of moral obligation of the potential perpetrator.59 When a certain social group exists 
outside the universe of moral obligation of other groups, it can experience a form of social death 
that can precede physical killing.60 Waller writes, “Genocide inflicts a social death which makes 
the victims’ lives, and their termination, meaningless.”61 Part of the process of mitigating the risk 
factors associated with social fragmentation, then, involves making the lives of fragmented groups 
meaningful to each other again, ensuring that all social groups exist within each other’s universe 
of moral obligation. This difficult task involves the generation of empathy, and memory initiatives 
have a role to play in this process, as well.
One key form of memory initiative connected to undoing social fragmentation and generating 
empathy between groups is historical dialogue programs. Elazar Barkan, perhaps the preeminent 
scholar in this field of historical dialogue, writes:
Conflict between groups is often transgenerational, and the historical animosity remains if it 
is not addressed. Fear and desire for revenge often linger and inform the policies of the groups 
involved, and are prone to be awakened by nationalists and fundamentalists as carriers of 
xenophobia. Historical dialogue aims to diffuse such hatred by engaging government and 
civil society in conversations about history and introducing empathy and even sympathy 
toward the other. Historical dialogue takes place directly and explicitly when two sides are 
engaged in joint historical writing, such as through a bilateral commission […], joint civil 
society projects, or other ways of producing historical knowledge.62 
Particularly in cases of intractable conflict—for example, Israel Palestine or the Balkans—opposing 
groups rarely interact with each other, much less attempt to understand the other’s point of 
view. As such, the groups remain fragmented, outside the other’s realm of moral obligation. 
Historical dialogue programs are a specific type of memory initiative that bring together 
representatives from these opposing groups to begin a dialogue. Importantly, the end goal of this 
dialogue is not necessarily consensus or total agreement on what occurred in the past and who 
is responsible. Rather, historical dialogue can be preventive primarily by bringing fragmented 
groups who never interact into the same space and secondarily by reaching a space of mutual 
Marcelo Brodsky, ed., Memory under Construction (Buenos Aires: La Marca Editora, 2005).
58 Whigham, “Filling the Absence.”
59 Helen Fein, Genocide: A Sociological Perspective (London: Sage, 1990).
60 Patterson Orlando, Slavery & Social Death: A Comparative Study (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ Press, 1985).
61 James Waller, Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 197.
62 Elazar Barkan, “Historical Dialogue and the Prevention of Atrocity Crimes,” in Reconstructing Atrocity Prevention, ed. 
Sheri P. Rosenberg, Tibi Galis, and Alex Zucker (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 182.
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respect and understanding in which opposing positions can exist in parallel without resulting in 
violent conflict. 
Ensuring free and open debate about the past is not always easy, especially when certain 
groups uphold a version of the past that rationalizes the violence that occurred. But if those voices 
are silenced completely or left out of the public sphere, societies risk polarizing these groups, 
encouraging factionalisms that can become quite dangerous and lead to the perpetration of 
further atrocities.63 Genocide scholar Scott Straus frames this notion a different way. He argues 
that genocides and other forms of mass categorical violence require a strong founding narrative, or 
a “preexisting ideological framework,” which justifies or legitimates violence toward a specific 
group identity.64 Straus stresses, however, that these violent founding narratives can and have been 
mitigated in a number of cases by strong counternarratives, which refute the ideological bases for 
violence that the founding narratives provide. Obviously, the development of counternarratives 
alongside other narratives requires an open and active public sphere, where different narratives 
can exist and discursively shape each other. Surely there is some risk involved in this openness, 
because it can allow public space for the airing of violent ideologies. This is also not to say that 
placing a modicum of restriction on the freedoms of speech and expression is wrong. I argue, 
however, that allowing public space for the expression of all viewpoints, including potentially 
dangerous ones, can be essential in creating a sense of urgency around the sorts of narratives or 
counternarratives that stress pluralism, inclusion, and non-violent conflict resolution. Historical 
dialogue is ultimately about critically examining the founding narratives that may lead to atrocity, 
while at the same time constructing or reinforcing counternarratives that may potentially prevent 
it.
Programs for historical dialogue can take a number of forms, but I will highlight two 
examples here to provide some level of illustration. Today in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there is still 
no consensus among the major ethnic groups regarding the violence that ripped the country 
apart in the 1990s. Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks), Bosnian Serbs, and Croats all have their own 
versions of the past, and each sees itself as the victim of the other groups. On top of this, the 
country is incredibly segregated, so most people do not live, work, learn, or interact with anyone 
aside from those in their own ethnic group. Each group has its own system of education, and 
while children all have similar math and science curricula, they each learn a completely different 
version of history.
In the face of this reality, the Center for Peacebuilding in Sanski Most, Bosnia-Herzegovina, is 
working, in their words, “to rebuild trust and foster reconciliation among the people of Bosnia—
Croats, Serbs, Bosniaks, and others.”65 The Center has developed a number of programs that bring 
together members from the different ethnic and religious groups of the country to talk openly and 
honestly about their own perceptions of the past and of the others. Among the various programs of 
the Center are their Peace Camps—weeklong gatherings of youth from all of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s 
ethnic groups. For many of the youth who participate in the Peace Camps, it is their first time 
interacting in a meaningful way with members of the other ethnic groups. They are encouraged to 
speak about topics that may be otherwise taboo, in an effort to build trust and understanding about 
the others’ perceptions and feelings about the past and the present. Participants are also trained 
in nonviolent conflict resolution strategies, and those who continue the training go on to lead 
similar dialogues with primary school children when they return home, giving the Peace Camps a 
multiplier effect. To date, hundreds of Bosnian youth from all ethnic groups have participated in 
the Peace Camps, and many of them maintain relationships both with the Center and their fellow 
participants after the Peace Camps are complete.
Another form of historical dialogue occurs through the implementation of historical commissions 
(HCs), which usually involve historians themselves coming together to debate opposing views of 
63 Waller, Confronting Evil.
64 Scott Straus, Making and Unmaking Nations: War, Leadership, and Genocide in Modern Africa (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2015), 11.
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the past and reach some level of agreement on how either the past or these disagreements should 
be presented. This process of historical debate and the construction of some form of “sanctioned” 
memory can serve to mitigate conflict between groups. Alexander Karn writes, “One interesting 
feature of the HCs is their ability to produce and circulate mediating narratives in societies where 
historical injustices have not been fully acknowledged. ‘Mediating’ refers to the recontextualization 
of past events to ensure they are presented in a nuanced, explanatory framework, rather than in 
a caustic, accusatory one.”66 In other words, HCs are not necessarily about reaching consensus 
over the past, but rather finding a way of contextualizing different views of the past so that their 
potential to ignite violent conflict is reduced. 
One such example comes from the Peace Research Institute in the Middle East (PRIME), which 
in the early 2000s worked with a group of Palestinian and Israeli history teachers to develop a 
joint history textbook for school children. The result of the process was a textbook that included 
the Israeli and Palestinian narratives relating to conflict in parallel, translated into both Hebrew 
and Arabic. According to the organizers of the project, “This would mean that each student would 
learn not only his/her own narrative, but also the narrative of the other, as a first step toward 
acknowledging and respecting the other.”67 In the early stages of development the authors also left 
a blank space in between the two narratives so that both students and their teachers could include 
their own perspectives. The long-term effects of this project are yet unclear as the final version 
of the textbook was only published in 2012,68 but some of the teachers involved in the project’s 
creation did provide some anecdotal evidence of the early test copies of the text. For example, one 
Palestinian teacher used the texts in his classroom and asked the students to write their responses: 
“Some of them expressed an interest in meeting Israeli pupils in order to discuss these texts 
together. Others wanted to know more about this date or that person, mentioned briefly in the 
texts. There were reports of students who immediately started to deconstruct the other’s narrative. 
In general, the two narratives evoked a surprise that created interest and curiosity.”69 Clearly, this 
shared textbook project has not brought an end to conflict in Israel/Palestine. In fact, both the 
example from Bosnia and this example demonstrate how difficult it is to mitigate the risk factors of 
atrocity when governmental actors cease to curtail rhetoric that only exacerbates division. But they 
also exemplify the hope of generating a transformation in the grassroots that could eventually have 
some impact on state discourse, as well. This is not to say, however, that memory initiatives cannot 
have an impact in mitigating risk factors for atrocity associated with the third and final category 
we will examine: governance. 
Governance
Under the category of governance, Waller outlines five risk factors for atrocity:  The first relates 
to regime type. Current research shows that atrocities are far more likely to occur under autocratic 
governments than democratic governments. Second, states that suffer from a legitimacy deficit—
that is, states that are not perceived as legitimate by their own citizens—are more at risk for 
atrocity than those in which the government has the support of its people. Third, states with strong 
structures for providing basic services, upholding the law, and responding to the needs of the 
population are less at risk for atrocity than those societies with weak state structures. Fourth, states 
that exemplify or encourage identity-based polar factionalism, where only certain identity groups are 
represented in the halls of government, are more at risk for atrocity. Finally, states that implement 
systematic acts of discrimination against certain groups are at higher risk for atrocity. Examples of 
such discrimination include “removal of civil liberties, restricting educational access, arbitrary 
detention or imprisonment, torture as state policy, large-scale illegal round-ups of civilians, the 
66 Alexander Karn, “Historical Commissions and Education Outreach: Challenges and Lessons for Transitional Justice,” in 
Transitional Justice and Education: Learning Peace, ed. Clara Ramírez-Barat and Roger Duthie (New York: SSRC, 2017), 
308.
67 Sami Adwan and Dan Bar-On, “Shared History Project: A PRIME Example of Peace-Building Under Fire,” International 
Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 17, no. 3 (2004), 516.
68 Sāmī ʻAbd al-Razzāq’ Adwān et al., Side by Side: Parallel Histories of Israel/Palestine (New York: The New Press, 2012).
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revocation of the right to citizenship, expropriation or destruction of property (including cultural, 
religious and sacred sites).”70
Ultimately, it may seem unlikely that memory initiatives can have a real impact on risk factors 
associated with governance, particularly those related to regime type, given that autocratic regimes 
are unlikely even to allow public memory initiatives that counter the discourse of the regime. Indeed, 
it is rare that a memory initiative can transform an autocratic government to a democratic one. That 
said, memory initiatives have often had an impact on bringing state-led impunity to an end, and 
therefore strengthening the rule of law, a necessary reality in democratic societies. One example of 
this comes from Argentina, which experienced nearly two decades of impunity for perpetrators of 
human rights violations during the military dictatorship of 1976-83. In the midst of this period in 
the mid-1990s, an activist group known as H.I.J.O.S. (the Spanish acronym for Sons and Daughters 
for Identity and Justice, against Forgetting and Silence) was formed by the sons and daughters of 
those who had been disappeared by the military juntas during the dictatorship. Through a creative 
form of street activism known as the escrache, H.I.J.O.S. pointed out the perpetrators living free 
and unpunished across the country and called on that perpetrator’s neighbors to “sentence” them 
by ostracizing them socially. H.I.J.O.S. constantly evoked the crimes of the past, as well as the 
activism of their disappeared parents, to transform the state of impunity to one of memory and 
justice. Their slogan, “If there is no justice, there will be escrache” (“Si no hay justicia, hay escrache”) 
promised that they would continue their activism until the government dismantled the system of 
impunity and reinstated the rule of law, whereby all perpetrators would be tried for their crimes. 
H.I.J.O.S. continued making escraches until 2005, when the government reinstated trials against 
the perpetrators. The role played by civil society and human rights organizations like H.I.J.O.S. 
was central to the transformation of Argentinean society from a culture of impunity to one of 
justice. According to Andrea Gualde, former National Director of Legal Affairs of the Secretariat 
of Human Rights of the Ministry of Justice in Argentina, “It would be impossible to approach a 
study of our country’s recent history without stating the central role played by the human rights 
movement in the political and social configuration of contemporary Argentina.”71 
Memory initiatives also have a real role to play in addressing deficits in the legitimacy of the 
state. One strong example of this comes from Indonesia. For decades, the Indonesian government 
refused to acknowledge the genocidal violence perpetrated by state and paramilitary actors in the 
1960s against so-called “communist subversives.” Annie E. Pohlman writes: 
Within broader understandings of restorative justice after the end of authoritarianism, 
Indonesia stands out as an example of how new regimes sacrifice any attempt at restoration 
or justice for the short-term goals of securing elite support for democratization. This support, 
however, has come at a high price: a low-quality democracy, the capture of the newly built 
democratic institutions by oligarchic elites, and now swift back stepping on hard-won 
reforms to ensure human rights.72 
In other words, the way that the Indonesian state had (not) dealt with the past resulted in the 
exacerbation of a number of risk factors: 1) a state legitimacy deficit, 2) a series of weak state 
structures, and 3) the risk factors associated with state-led discrimination, given that the government 
was controlled by oligarchs that prevented non-elites from assuming any form of power. In light 
of these realities, a coalition of forty-seven grassroots organizations declared 2013 the Year of Truth 
in Indonesia. Participating NGOs spent the year gathering a bevy of video testimonies, which were 
professionally edited and distributed using YouTube and an array of social media strategies. The 
Year of Truth culminated in November 2013 with a national forum called “Hearing Testimony,” in 
70 Waller, Confronting Evil, 159.
71 Andrea Gualde, “Reparations for Crimes against Humanity as Public Policy: Argentina’s Relationship with the Past, 
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Prevention Series (New York: Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation, 2015), 27.
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which survivors testified to the many manifestations of violence during and in the aftermath of the 
massacres of the 1960s.73 The following year, Joko Widodo became the first democratically elected 
president who was not a member of the traditional ruling elites. Among his campaign promises 
was to deal more actively with Indonesia’s history of abuses, and he began to fulfill this promise 
in 2016, first by initiating a National Symposium on the massacres of the 1960s, and then by calling 
for an investigation of the mass graves relating to this period.74 Although these two measures 
represent only the beginning of a process that will hopefully continue, they certainly demonstrate 
how the civil society memory initiatives of the Year of Truth both marked and contributed to a sea 
change in the way the Indonesian state would deal with its past. The election of Widodo marked an 
opening of the political space to non-elites, thus mitigating some of the risk factors related to state-
led discrimination, and Widodo’s subsequent acknowledgements of the violence of the 1960s—a 
break from half a century of total silence on the part of the state—has begun the work of repairing 
the state legitimacy deficit that also presents a risk for future atrocities.
Although it may be true that the most visible and widely discussed aspects of dealing with 
the past—from truth commissions to criminal prosecution to reparations to institutional reform—
require the participation of governmental actors, the fact remains that most of these processes 
initiate through a movement from the grassroots that begins long before the state opts to assume 
responsibility for these projects.75 Through memory initiatives like those outlined above, non-
governmental actors can have a real role in transforming the way the state functions and responds 
to the past. In the meantime, they are reducing a number of risk factors for atrocity associated with 
governance by invigorating a public sphere within which their voices are heard and their calls for 
truth, memory, and justice are answered.
Conclusion
Rieff is not wrong that memory of the past can be difficult and its instrumentalization can, in some 
cases, provoke conflict. All of the examples he offers to prove his point, however, are cases where 
memory is being used to isolate, rather than to bring people together. The atomizing effects of 
genocidal violence are still in play. There is another potential for memory in these places, however, 
and that potential does not exist in advocating for memory’s elimination (as if that were even 
possible). Rather, the discomforts and the pain of the past, which are often felt to varying degrees 
on all sides of the social equation, could provide a starting point for a new conversation—one that 
leads to new levels of understanding and empathy. It is not an easy process, nor is it a quick one. 
But here the pliability of memory is actually its greatest asset. The fact that memory narratives can 
change means that damaging views of the past, which serve to fragment societies, rather than bring 
them together, can be rewritten. With a great deal of effort, new narratives can be generated…
narratives that counter the dangerous incitements of the old narratives and that, as they gain 
traction, provide a much greater potential of preventing the return of old hostilities in the future. 
These new narratives, however, will not emerge spontaneously. They require the dedication and 
intention of memory workers—both at the state and grassroots levels—who endeavor to implement 
memory initiatives meant not to divide, but to unite.
In this article I have focused on an array of memory initiatives, offering only a handful of 
examples of the myriad ways these practices have manifested and how they have mitigated, 
at least partially, some of the risk factors for atrocity associated with conflict history, social 
fragmentation, and governance. Although these practices are all quite different, and while the 
kinds of memory initiatives that emerge from within a post-atrocity society are certainly always 
specific to the cultural and historical contexts of the society itself, all of the practices I highlight 
have one important thing in common—and it is, for me, the essential quality that makes them 
73 Pohlman, “A Year of Truth.”
74 Benny Widyono, “The Legacy of Cold War Era Massacres in Cambodia and Indonesia,” in Societies Emerging from 
Conflict: The Aftermath of Atrocity, ed. Dennis Klein (New York: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Forthcoming).
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potentially preventive. All of these practices center on the coming together of physical bodies in 
public space in one way or other. It is easy to think about memory as something that happens only 
in the mind of the individual. In reality, memory is a force that is embodied and that affects the 
ways our bodies interact with others. When memory isolates or atomizes bodies, it has little chance 
at being preventive. On the other hand, when it draws people together in the public sphere—even 
when it leads to nonviolent disputes and contentious debates—memory has a much greater chance 
of preventing genocidal violence. Of course, memory alone is not enough. Prevention requires 
an effort from all levels of society: state to civil society, local to global, young to old. To be sure, 
however, memory can be a factor in prevention. As I said earlier, whether we want it or not, memory 
will be. How we approach memory is the key to determining whether it will be destructive or will be 
preventive.
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